Evidence for the existence of a soul

The thirteenth verse of the second chapter of the 'Gita answers one of the most fundamental questions concerning spirituality: what basis exists for one to accept that anything of oneself exists beyond one's body?

The commentary of Srimad Ananda Tîrtha on Bhagavad Gita II-13 must surely rank as an all-time classic; it is indeed a complete, if abbreviated, course in Vedanta all by itself, and outranks by far all other attempts to explain the verse.  In his explanations alone does one find the kind of intellectual honesty that keeps up a natural thread of argument without digressions or dogma, and which also does not injure the text with extrinsic and unsupported ideas which occlude or obscure the original theme in other commentaries.

Another notable feature is the subcommentary of Sri Jayatîrtha on this verse, which also is a good illustration for why many who have examined his writings feel that he has served his master better than has any other commentator on any other bhAshhyakAra's writings.  It would not be an exaggeration to say that Sri Jayatîrtha is the greatest writer one has seen in any language, and that his writings, which present complicated concepts accurately yet simply, are surely a benchmark or standard for exposition.  While Sri Jayatîrtha modestly disclaims any originality of thought in the matter of explaining the gItA-bhAshhya or any other text, saying that he is merely repeating like a parrot what was taught to him by his Guru: `axobhyatIrthaguruNA shukavat.h shixitasya me', anyone may discover improvement in his or her own writing style by careful understanding of the writing style employed by Sri Jayatîrtha, and that this is not true just of people like oneself is evident from the writings of later stalwarts of the tradition.

For some context, the previous verse of the 'Gita runs as follows:

  na tvevAhaM jAtu nAsaM na tvaM neme janAdhipAH  |
  na chaiva na bhavishhyAmaH sarve vayamataH param.h  || 12 ||

  Just as it was never that I was not, [likewise] not [that] you 
  [were not], nor [that] these rulers of people [were not]; not 
  certainly also will there ever be a time when we shall not exist, 
  for which reason we are all eternal.
A special feature of Srimad Acharya's commentary on II-12 is that he takes the `tu' in `na tu eva aham.h' as indicating that Krishna's eternality is used as the example to illustrate the eternality of all others:
IshvaranityatvasyAprastutatvAt.h dR^ishhTAntatvenAha --`na tu' iti  |  
yathA.ahaM nityaH sarvavedAnteshhu prasiddhaH, evaM tvamete 
janAdhipAshcha nityAH  || 12 ||

Since the eternality of the Ishvara is not [directly] relevant here,
it is stated as an illustration -- `na tu', thus.  "Just as I
(Krishna) am well known as being eternal from all Vedanta, so also are
you and these kings eternal" [thus is the intended meaning].
Sri Jayatîrtha quotes statements in this context showing the eternality of the Lord, such as `nityo nityAnAm.h', etc., and further points out that while one would think that the eternality of the soul and of the Lord would be equally known from such, due to incorrect explanations which posit that Brahman alone is real while nothing else is, this understanding is made impossible; hence, he says, Krishna here is stating that just as Brahman is real, so also are the distinct plural selves -- this clarifies the correct position even from such a perspective. This certainly seems a more thoughtful explanation than the bland exposition, "Never was there a time when I did not exist, nor you, nor all these kings; nor in the future shall any of us cease to be," and the likes of it found elsewhere. In his commentary, Sri Shankara avers that the plural `vayam.h' in II-12 is used in the verse to indicate plurality of bodies, not to indicate plurality of selves: `dehabhedAnuvR^ittyA bahuvachanaM, na AtmabhedAbhiprAyeNa'.  This is replied to in the prameya-dIpikA by saying:
  atra bhagavatA jIvAnAM parasparaM IshvarAchcha bhede pratipAdite.api
  bahuvachanaM sharIrApexayA iti vadato bhavishhyati ityuttaram.h  |

  Here, even though the difference of Lord and soul, and mutually
  among souls is propounded, the plural is only in reference to
  bodies, for those who say this, `will be' is the response.
How is it that there "will be" difference always even though the present bodies won't?
  nanu chAtra kiM paridR^ishyamAnadehapaxIkAreNa anumIyate, kiM vA
  tadatiriktadehapaxIkAreNa  |  nAdyaH  |  dehotpattivinAshayoH
  pratyaxasiddhatvena hetoH svarUpAsiddhatvAt.h, 
  kAlatyayApadishhTatvAchcheti sphuTatvAt.h noktam.h  |  

  However, here, is it that plurality is indicated on account of
  bodies presently seen, or on account of some other bodies?  Not
  the first.  Since the creation and destruction of bodies is proven
  from pratyaksha, the nature of the cause cannot be determined, and
  the rationale is violated with changes in time; this being clear,
  it is not stated.
The idea being, of course, that if the bodies had been mere upAdhI-s that cause difference to appear where there is none, then such difference should not have continued past the bodies themselves.  How can it be claimed that difference is merely perceived where it does not exist, when the alleged upAdhI-s that are supposed to make difference appear when none exists, are themselves not constant over the range of the perception of difference, and when it has been asserted that difference will continue even after the bodies are gone? Sri Jayatîrtha continues:
  dvitIye, doshhamAha -- `dehina', iti  |

  In the second case (where the bodies are other than those seen), a
  flaw is shown -- `the embodied', thus.
Here begins the commentary on II-13.
bhAshhya -- 

dehino bhAva etadbhavati  |  tadevAsiddhamiti chenna -- `dehino.asmin.h'

The [distinct] embodied is possible in this manner.  That itself is
unproven, so say you? -- no (that is not right): `the embodied'.

prameya-dIpikA TippaNi --

  dehinaH dehavataH dehAtiriktasyAtmanaH sadbhAve, etat.h
  nityatvAnumAnam.h  |  bhavati sambhavati  |  dehapaxokta-
  doshhAbhAvAt.h  |  kintu taddehAtiriktAtmasattvamevAsiddham.h  |
  pramANAbhAvAt.h  |  tatashchAsiddhiriti  |  astu vA dehAtirikta
  Atmasattvam.h  |  tathApi nAnumAnaM sambhavatItyAha -- `dehina'
  iti  |  `dehinaH' iti ekavachanaM tantram.h  |  tatpUrvottara
  deheshhu eka evAyaM ityasyArthasya bhAva etadanumAnaM
  sambhavati  |  svarUpAsiddhyAdyabhAvAt.h  |  kiM nAma
  tatpUrvottaradeheshhu AtmaikatvamevAsiddham.h ?  pramANAbhAvAt.h  |
  tathA cha dehotpattAvutpattimataH tadvinAshe cha nAshavataH
  kathamanAditvena nityAtvaM sAdhyata -- iti  |  ubhayasyApi
  parihAradarshanAdeyaM yojyam.h  |  arthadvayAnuguNyAyaiva
  bahuvachane prakR^ite.api ekavachanam.h  |  tathA bhAva iti
  pulliN^ge napuMsakanirdeshaH  |  netyAha, iti sheshhaH  |
  dehino.asminnityataH paramitishabdashcha  |

  In order to show the existence of the embodied in the body,
  this is an argument for eternality. `bhavati' means "is possible."
 "It is the case that there is no flaw in saying that the body 
  alone is.  On the other hand, the soul other than the body which is 
  said to exist, is itself unproven, there being no pramANa for the 
  same, owing to the latter itself (a possible pramANa for the soul) 
  itself being unproven.  Or else, let us grant that there does 
  exist a soul other than the body.  Even then, a logical argument 
  for the same is impossible" -- in reply to this, it is stated,
 `dehina' (the embodied), thus.  The use of the singular `dehina' is
  the means.  By it, the inference that it is the same [embodied] one
  who resides in previous and later bodies, thus is possible.  Since
  the lack of proof of its nature, etc. (as claimed by the chArvAka)
  is absent.  How is it that the identity of the soul present in
  earlier and later bodies is itself unproven?  (An objector
  replies:) "On account of lack of means of knowledge -- since it is
  produced when the body is produced, and destroyed when the body
  is destroyed, how do you deduce eternality based on continuity of
  the same?"  Both objections are answered by this premise.  It is
  for the purpose of covering both possible meanings, that even though
  the context is plural, the singular (i.e., `dehina') is used.  So
  also, with `bhAva' being masculine, the neuter is required.  That
  it is not so, is the remainder.  The embodied is immortal, for being
  eternal, to say this, `iti' (thus) is used as well.

bhagavad.h gItA --

  dehino.asmin.h yathA dehe kaumAraM yauvanaM jarA  |
  tathA dehAntaraprAptirdhIrastatra na muhyati  || 13 ||

  Just as the embodied experiences the infancy, the youth, and the
  old age of the body; so also the obtaining of another body, and
  in this matter the intelligent one is not deluded.

bhAshhya --

yathA kaumArAdisharIrabhede.api dehI tadIxitA siddhaH  |  evaM
dehAntaraprAptAvapi  |  IxitR^itvAt.h  |

Just as even when there is difference in bodies from childhood, etc.,
the experience of the same by the embodied is proven.  So too, with
the change of bodies.  On account of being the experiencer.

pra. dI. --

  AxepadvayaparihArAya pAdatrayaM vyAkhyAti -- `yathA' iti  |
  atra `dehI tadIxitA siddhaH' iti dehAtirikta AtmasAdhanam.h  |
 `tad.h' iti kaumArAdiparAmarshaH  |  yAjakAditvAtsamAsaH  |
  dvitIyAntasya tR^innantena vA samAsaH  |  asti tAvat.h
  kaumArAdivishhayamIxaNam.h  |  na chexaNamIxitAraM vinA
  sambhavati  |  sa cha vaxyamANAt.h parisheshhapramANAt.h
  dehI dehAtirikta siddha -- iti  | 

  In order to remove the duo of objections, the triad of phrases
  (in the verse) is explained -- `yathA', thus.  By saying, `dehI
  tadIxitA siddhaH' (the experience of that by the embodied
  is proven), a soul other than the body is shown.  By saying
 `tad.h', the states of childhood, etc., are referred to.  By the
 `yAjaka' rule, is the samAsa.  Or alternatively, the samAsa is
  to cause the dvitIya-ending to be read as a tR^itIya.  There
  does exist experience of the states of childhood, etc.  It is
  not possible to have experience in the absence of a experiencer.
  Thus, by the proof-by-elimination to be stated (which shows that
  this experiencer cannot be the body or the mind), the embodied
  other than the body is proved -- thus.  

  atra kaumArAdigrahaNaM atantram.h  |  j~nAnamAtreNa 
  j~nAtR^itvasiddheH  |  dehashabdashchendriyAdisahita-
  sharIravR^ittiH  |  shloke cha `kaumAraM yauvanaM jarA' iti 
  vishhayeNa vishhayIxaNamupalaxyate  |  tat.h dehino 
  dehAtiriktasyetyuktaM bhavati  |  yathetyAdisamastavAkyaM shloke 
  cha pAdatrayaM dehabhede.api AtmaikatvasAdhanam.h  |  
  kaumArAdimachchharIrabheda ityarthaH  |  dehyeka evetyarthaH  |  
 `tadIxitA' iti yo.ahaM kumArasharIravAn.h abhUvaM sa idAnIM 
  yuvasharIravAn.h varta ityAdipratyabhij~nAtetyarthaH  |  
  dehAntaraprAptAvapItyanekadehaprAptAvapi ityarthaH  |  eka eva 
  dehI siddha iti vartate  |

  Here, the perception of childhood, etc., are the means.  For
  merely by there being knowledge, the experiencing of the same is
  proven.  By the word `deha', the body including the sense-organs,
  etc., is intended.  In the shloka's `kaumAraM yauvanaM jarA',
  by these subjects, the perception of the states is indicated.
  By the embodied, who is different from the body, thus is to be
  stated.  All the statements (of Srimad Acharya) beginning with
 `yathA', are intended to show the identity of the soul in spite of
  the changes in the body, as intended in the [first] three quarters 
  of the shloka.  Even on account of there being differences in the
  body on account of childhood, etc.  That there is only one embodied,
  is the meaning.  By `tadIxitA', "I, who was in a child's body
  previously, am in a youthful body now," thuslike recognition is
  indicated.  By `dehAntaraprAptau api' (even on possession of a 
  different body), even on possession of many different bodies, thus
  is the meaning.  Only one embodied is shown, is the meaning.

 `IxitR^itvAt.h' iti pratyagrajAtasya shishorAhArAdyabhilAshheNa
  pUrvadehAnusandhAnasiddherityAshayaH  |  evamAtmano dehAtirekaM
  dehabhedepyekatvaM cha prasAdhya `dhIrastatra na muhyati'
  ityuchyate  |  tasya vaiyarthyamityAshaN^kya ye.asmin.h
  vishhaye.anye.api mohahetavaH te dhIreNa svayaM nirAkAryA
  ityevamarthatvAt.h na vaiyarthyamityAshayavAn.h tat.h
  pradarshanArthamuttaraM prakaraNamArabhate  |  

  By `IxitR^itvAt.h', it is indicated that on account of a
  new-born infant's behavior in a manner learned in previous bodies,
  in matters of food, etc., such is proved.  And taking into account
  the identity of the soul even upon difference in bodies, `the
  intelligent is not deluded', thus is stated.  "But this is useless,"
  to remove such a doubt, in this matter, and also in others, whatever
  are causes of delusion, they are subject to removal by the intelligent
  by himself, to indicate this meaning, and thus show that there is
  no uselessness, the next text is begun.   

  tatrexaNena kathaM dehAtiriktAtmasiddhiH ?  IxitA hi tena siddhyati  |
  sa cha sharIraprANajATharAnalendriyamanovishhayasannidhau
  IxaNadarshanAt.h teshhvanyatamaH kiM na syAd.h ?  ityataH 
  sharIrasya tAvAdIxaNaM nishhedhati --

  "But on account of there being experience, how is a soul other than
  the body proven?  Only the experiencing by it (the body) is shown
  thereby.  As the experience by the cumulus of body, prANa, digestive
  fire, and mind is seen, why is it necessary to posit something else
  than these?"  To answer this, the experiencing by the body is
  refuted --

bhAshhya --

na hi jaDasya sharIrasya kaumArAdyanubhavassambhavati  |
mR^itasyAdarshanAt.h  |  mR^itasya vAyvAdyapagamAd.h
anubhavAbhAvaH  |  `ahaM manushhyaH' ityAdyanubhavAchchaitat.h
siddhamiti chet.h ?  na -- satyevAvisheshhe dehe suptyAdau
j~nAnAdivisheshhAdarshanAt.h  |

Indeed, the insentient and the body cannot experience childhood, etc.
As such [experiencing] is not seen in the dead.  When the breath,
etc., leave the dead, there is no experience.  "I am human," suchlike
experience itself proves that [the body experiences], so say you?  No
-- for even while the body exists, during deep sleep, etc., special
aspects of knowledge, etc., are absent.

pra. dI. --

  atrApi `kaumArAdi' ityatantram.h  |  sharIrasyAnubhavo na
  sambhavatIti pratij~nA  |  `jaDasya', `sharIrasya', iti
  hetudvayam.h  |  mR^itasyAdarshanAditi dR^ishhTAntoktiH  |
  jaDatvaM cha bhautikatvaM vivaxitamiti na sAdhyAvishishhTatA  |
  aprayojakatvAbhiprAyeNa shaN^kate -- `mR^itasya', iti  |
  jIvachchharIramR^itasharIrayorbhautikatve sharIratve 
  samAne.api mA bhUt.h mR^itasharIrasyexaNam.h  |  prANAdi
  vAyUnAM jATharAnalasyendriyANAM chApagamAt.h  |  jIvatastu
  prANAdisannidhAnAdbhavishhyati  |  ko virodhaH ?  mA hi
  bhUdekadharmopapannAnAmavAntarakAraNavaichitryAt.h vaichitryA-
  bhAvaH  |  na kevalamidamAshaN^kyate  |  kintu `ahaM
  manushhyaH' ityAdyanubhavAdetat.h dehasyexitR^itvaM siddhaM,
  pramitaM cha, ityarthaH  |  dUshhayati -- `na' iti  |  na
  prANAdisannidhAnaM sharIrasyexitR^itve prayojakaM vAchyam.h  |
  suptimUrchhayoH sharIre prANAdyapagamalaxaNavisheshharahite
  satyeva j~nAnAdinAM dharmANAmadarshanAt.h  |  j~nAnagrahaNaM
  upalaxaNam.h  |  sukhaduHkhechchhAdveshhaprayatnairapyAtmA
  sAdhya iti sUchayitumAdipadam.h  |  mR^itAdau j~nAnAdi
  abhAvashcha tatkAryAdarshanAt.h siddha iti darshayituM
  j~nAnAdivisheshhetyuktam.h  |  j~nAnAdInAM visheshhaH 
  kAryamiti  |  etena saN^ghAtachaitanyapaxaH prANAdichaitanya-
  paxashcha parAkR^ito veditavyaH  |

  Even here, `kaumArAdi' (infancy, etc.) is the means.  That the
  body cannot experience, thus is the claim (to be proven).  `jaDasya'
  (for the insentient), and `sharIrasya' (for the body), thus are the
  twin reaons.  "Because such is not seen in the dead," thus the
  illustration is given (i.e., if the insentient in general and the
  body in particular could experience, then why don't the dead?).
  But insentience is the same as physical inertness, thus there is
  identity of the antecedent and the claim to be proven -- such is
  not so.  This is refuted by way of uselessness -- `mR^itasya'
  (in the dead), thus.  Although physical structure is common to the
  living body and the dead body, experience is not seen in case of
  the dead body.  On account of the `vAyu'-s such as `prANa' (prANa,
  apAna, vyAna, udAna, and samAna), and also [the deities of] the 
  digestive fire, and sensory organs, having departed.  Even the
  living is only able to on account of the presence of prANa, etc.
  What is incorrect [about this]?  Indeed, it cannot be that on account
  of one accepting only one kind of quality (i.e., that which can
  be physically perceived), given the strangeness of the other cause,
  the strangeness itself is absent.  But [says the chArvAka] this is 
  not the only objection; by "I am a human," suchlike experience,
  the experiencing by the body is known and proven, thus is the
  meaning.  This is refuted -- `na', thus.  It cannot be said that
  the presence of prANa, etc., is an aid to the experiencing by the
  body (instead of by the sentient agent within).  Since during sleep
  and syncope, even though the special characteristics indicating the
  departure of prANa, etc., are absent, properties such as grasping of
  knowledge are not seen.  Here, "grasping of knowledge" is an example
  (of what is not seen).  To indicate that by joy, suffering, desire, 
  hatred, effort, only by such things is sentience shown, the word
  `Adi' is used.  In the dead, etc., the lack of knowledge, etc., is
  shown on account of the lack of actions based on these -- to show 
  this, `j~nAnAdivisheshha', thus is stated.  The special aspects like
  action, etc., arising out of knowledge, thus [is the meaning].
  By this [set of arguments], the claim of the sentience of the whole
  (collection of body and prANa, etc.), and the sentience of the
  prANa, etc., also is refuted, thus may be known.
However, there are yet others who claim that while gross objects and the body may not have sentience, what we term as consciousness is perhaps just a brain function, or is the mind itself which is born with the body and dies with it.  These claims are refuted as follows:
bhAshhya --

samashchAbhimAno manasi  |  kAshhThAdivachcha  |

Likewise, in respect of the mind.  Also like wood, etc.

pra. dI. --

  manasa IxitR^itvamatideshena nirAchashhTe -- `samashcha' 
  iti  |  manovishhaya IxitR^itvAbhimAnashcha pUrveNa samaH  |  
  suptyAdau satyapi manasi j~nAnAdarshanAt.h  |  evaM tarhi
  AtmApi j~nAtA na syAditi chenna  |  tadA tasya manasA
  sannikarshhAbhAvAt.h  |  manaso.api tathA.astviti chet.h  |
  siddhastAvadAtmA  |  manaso j~nAtR^itve doshhAntaramAha --
 `kAshhThAdi' iti -- mano na j~nAtR^i, j~nAnakaraNatvAt.h  |
  yadyasyAM kriyAyAM karaNaM na tattatra kartR^i, yathA pAke
  kAshhThAdi  |  chhidAyAM kuThAro vA  |  na chAsiddho hetuH  |
 `manasA jAnAmi' iti anubhavAt.h  |  etenAtmasannikarshheNa
  mano j~nAtriti nirastam.h  |

  The status of the mind as experiencer is likewise refuted
  -- `samashcha', thus.  The assumption of experience in regard
  to the mind is similar to the previous (assumption of such in
  regard to the gross body).  Since during sleep, etc., even though
  the mind is present, it is not seen to have knowledge.  But by
  the same argument, even the soul would not be an experiencer,
  so say you? -- no, because then it lacks contact with the mind.
  Let it be so with the mind as well, so say you?  Then the soul
  stands proved.  A different flaw in respect of the experiencing
  by the mind is stated -- `kAshhThAdhi' (wood, etc.), thus.
  [This means to say,] "The mind is not the knower, for being a
  tool of knowledge."  Whatever is a tool for a certain action,
  it is not the actor for that action, just as firewood used in
  cooking [is not the cook].  Or else, as an ax that splits wood
  [is not the woodcutter].  It cannot be said that the referent 
  (the mind) is itself unproven, as "I know from my mind," such 
  experience exists.  As its contact with the soul exists, the 
  hypothesis that the mind is the knower stands refuted.

  nanu janyaj~nAnaM manonishhThamiti siddhAntaH  |  tat.h
  kathametat.h ?  maivam.h -- manonishhThasyApi j~nAnasya na
  manaH kartR^i  |  kintvAtmaiva  |  yathA.avayava-
  vikledalaxaNasya pAkasya na taNDulAH kartAraH, kintu 
  devadatta -- iti  |  etenendriyachaitanyapaxo.api nirastaH  |
 `chaxushhA pAshyAmi' ityAdau teshhAmapi karaNatva 
  pratiteriti  |  atItAdij~nAnadarshanAt.h vishhaya-
  chaitanyapaxaH sphuTadUshhaNa iti na nirAkR^itaH  |  evaM
  parisheshhapramANena dehAtirikta AtmA siddhaH  |  

 "However, it is standard doctrine that created knowledge is
  present in the mind.  So what is all this?" [thus is the doubt.]
  Certainly not so -- even in case of knowledge that resides in
  the mind, the mind is not the doer.  But the soul alone is.
  Just as food that resides in the shape of a container is not
  created by the vessel, but by Devadatta only.  By this, even
  the case for the sentience of the sense-organs is refuted, as
  by [experiences] like "I see with my eyes," even their being
  tools is known, thus.  On account of presence of knowledge
  about past events, etc., the position that knowledge resides in
  objects of perceptions is automatically seen to be wrong, and is
  hence not refuted.  Also, by proof-by-elimination (an experiencer
  exists; the body is not the experiencer, no sense-organ is an
  experiencer, and the mind is not the experiencer; thus, an entity
  apart from these which experiences must exist), a soul other than
  the body stands proved.

bhAshhya --

shruteshcha  |  prAmANyaM pratyaxAdivat.h  |  na cha 
bauddhAdivat.h  |  apaurushheyatvAt.h  |  na hi apaurushheye
paurushheyAj~nAnAdayaH kalpayituM shakyAH  |

By Shruti, as well.  Its validity [is] as with experience, etc.  Not
like the Buddhist [statements], etc.  Because of unauthoredness.
Indeed, it is not possible to impute authored qualities of
ignorance, etc., in the unauthored.

pra. dI. --

  tasya svabhAvAdevAhArAdyabhilAshhopapatteH pratyabhij~nAnaM
  asiddhaM iti vadantaM prati Atmanityatve pramANAntaraM
  chAha -- `shruteshcha' iti  |  `asmAchchharIrabhedAdUrdhvaM
  utkramyAmushhmin.h svarge loke' ityAdi shruteshcha
  dehAtirikto nitya AtmA siddhaH  |  ata eva na svabhAva-
  vAdAvakAsha iti  |

  Against the one who holds that the desire to obtain food, etc.,
  [in a new-born infant] does not show pre-existing knowledge and 
  is of the [body's] self-same nature, and a soul cannot be proven, 
  in order to prove the eternality of the soul, another pramANa 
  is stated herewith -- `shruteshcha', thus.  By Shruti statements 
  like  `asmAchchhharIrabhedAdUrdhvaM utkramyAmushhmin.h svarge loke', 
  (on account of being different from the present body, he rises
  upwards and enjoys the joys to be found in the abode of heaven)  
  etc., the existence of an eternal soul other than the body is 
  proven.  Therefore, there is no scope for the theory that
  such action is the body's own nature, thus.

  nanu, bauddhachArvAkAdIn.h prati dehAtiriktanityAtmasAdhanaM
  idam.h -- na cha shruteH prAmANyaM aN^gIkurvate  |  tatkathaM
  shrutyudAharaNam.h ?  ityata Aha -- `prAmANyaM cha' iti  |
  bauddhena tAvat.h pratyaxAnumAnayoH, chArvAkeNa cha 
  pratyaxasya prAmANyaM aN^gIkriyatAm.h  |  tat.h kuta iti
  vaktavyam.h  |  bodhakatveneti chet.h tarhi tadvat.h 
  shruterapyaN^gIkriyatAm.h  |  

 "However, this statement of proof of an eternal soul apart from
  the body is directed at Buddhists and materialists -- they do
  not accept the validity of Shruti.  So how come the quoting of
  Shruti?" -- for that, it is said, `prAmANyaM cha', thus.  By
  Buddhists, pratyaxa (experience) and anumAna (inference), and
  by materialists, (only) pratyaxa, are considered valid.  "So 
  what?" -- thus may be asked: in the same fashion as those, on 
  account of being able to inform (just as these do), the same 
  notion of validity must be accepted in the instance of Shruti 
  as well.

  nanu vAkyatve same.api keshhAJNchidbauddhAdivAkyAnAM 
  aprAmANyadarshanAt.h shruterapi tadAshaN^kyata ityata Aha -- 
 `na cha' iti  |  buddhasyedaM bauddham.h  |  chArvAko 
  bauddhamudAharati  |  bauddhastvanyaditi drashhTavyam.h  |  
  aprAmANyaM shruteH shaN^kanIyamiti sheshhaH  |  tathA sati 
  indriyaliN^gayorapi kvachidaprAmANyadarshanAt.h  
  sampratipannayorapi pratyaxAnumAnayoH tachchhaN^kAprasaN^gAditi 
  bhAvaH  |  prasaktApi shaN^kA tatra nirdoshhatvenApanIyata iti 
  chet.h ?  samaM prakR^ite.apItyAha -- `apaurushheyatvAd.h', iti  |
 `apaurushheyatve.api doshhitvaM kiM na syAd.h?' ityata Aha -- `na
  hi', iti  |  sAmAnyoktitvAt.h `apaurushheye' iti 
  napuMsakoktiH  |  anyathA shruteH prakR^itatvAt.h strIliN^gaM
  syAt.h  |  shabde hyabodhakatvAdayo doshhAH  |  te cha
  vaktR^ipurushhAshritAj~nAnAdimUlAH  |  yasya tu vaktA 
  purushha eva nAsti tatra kathaM vaktR^ipurushhAshrita
  aj~nAnAdayo doshhAH doshhamUlatvena kalpayituM shakyAH  |
  vyAhateriti  |  atrAj~nAnAdInAM paurushheyatvoktirupa-
  chArAt.h  |  purushhashabdAt.h tatkR^itavAkyAdishhveva
  DhaJNaH smaraNAt.h  |

 "However, although the sententiality is alike, since some 
  statements of the Buddhists, etc., are seen to be incorrect, the 
  same doubt exists in regard to Shruti as well" -- to answer this, 
  it is stated, `na cha', thus.  What is Buddha's [statement] is 
  Buddhist.  The chArvAka-s give the example of the Buddhists.
  The Buddhists (who also do not accept the prAmANya of Shruti)
  are seen to give other examples.  "The incorrectness of Shruti 
  may thus be doubted," thus is the purport.  And then, too, 
  becausesome inaccuracy is also seen in respect of the organs of 
  perception,such may be doubted even in respect of all perception 
  and inference, thus is the purport.  The present *doubt* is to 
  be accepted on account of its flawlessness, thus say you?  Then
  the same is true even in case of that under discussion, to say
  this it is said -- `because of unauthoredness', thus.  But why
  can there not be flaws even in spite of unauthoredness? -- to
  answer this, it is said, `na hi', thus.  Because the common is
  being stated, `apaurushheye', thus the neuter is used (instead
  of the feminine).  Otherwise, because `shruti' is the subject,
  the feminine gender would be appropriate.  In respect of words
  (and sentences, etc.), `abodhakatva', etc., are the flaws
  (`abodhakatva' = lack of meaning; `viparItabodhakatva' = incorrect
  meaning; `anvayAbhAva = lack of connection to present topic, etc.  A
  total of some 22 separate flaws are given in the pramANa-paddhati.)
  And they have their origins in the flaws such as ignorance (and
  doubt, deceit, etc.) in the person who authors them.  For 
  [sentences] which have no author at all, how is it possible in
  their case to imagine flaws that must originate in the flaws of
  authors?  Because of contradition, thus.  Because ignorance, etc.,
  are personal qualities, thus is well known (and it is not known
  that they can exist independently in the abstract).  And only
  on account of a person's words (being based on ignorance, etc.),
  that person's sentences, etc. (may also be flawed).

  nanu shruterapaurushheyatvameva nAsti, vAkyatvAt.h, laukika-
  vAkyavat.h, iti chet.h ?  kimevaM vadataH kimapi vAkyaM
  apaurushheyaM nAstIti matam.h, uta kiJNchidastIti ?

 "But there is no unauthoredness in respect of Shruti itself,
  on account of its being formed of sentences, just like
  worldly sentences" -- so say you?  In saying this, do you hold
  (1) that there is no unauthoredness in respect of any sentence
  at all, or that (2) there is some such sentence (though not 
  the well-known Shruti)?

bhAshhya --

vinA na kasyachit.h vAkyasyApaurushheyatvaM sarvasamayAbhimata-
dharmAdyasiddhiH  |

Without [accepting] unauthoredness in respect of some sentences or the
other, the concepts of right, etc., accepted by all,cannot be proven.

pra. dI. --

  Adye, doshhamAha -- `vinA cha', iti  |  kasyachidvAkyasya
  apaurushheyatvAbhAve dharmAdharmayoranishchayaH prasajyeta  |
  nishchAyakAbhAvAt.h  |  na cha tathAstviti vaktuM shakyam.h  |
  tatsadbhAvasya sarvaiH samayibhirnishchitatvAditi  |  

  In the first case, a flaw is shown -- "without some," thus.  If some
  unauthored sentence or the other is not accepted, then do you
  propose indecision in the matter of right and wrong?  For there
  would be a lack of a decisive source.  "Let it be so," thus it
  is not possible to say.  Because all scholars do conclude their
The second case, where some unauthored sentences apart from the well-known Shruti are postulated, merits no attention as it involves kalpanA-gaurava (respect for imagination): for having rejected the well-known texts that are famous for not having authors, how can such a characteristic of unauthoredness be postulated in respect of unknown other texts that do not have such fame?   Because this point is obvious, it has not been highlighed by our commentator.

At that, the pUrva-paxin.h is liable to say, all right, so neither do I accept the well-known Shruti, nor do I posit apaurushheyatva in respect of unknown other texts; I simply refuse to accept that the extra-sensory entities of dharma, etc., exist, and need Shruti to propound them.  As there is no need for dharma, etc., at all, why bother about the need for Shruti to propound them?

bhAshhya --

yashcha tau nAN^gIkurute nAsau samayI  |  aprayojakatvAt.h  |

And one who does not accept these is not a scholar.  Due to

pra. dI. --

  nanu pratyaxaikapramANavAdI yaH chArvAko dharmAdharmau 
  nAN^gIkurute tasya nedaM anishhTam.h  |  kimapyapaurushheya-
  vAkyamanaN^gIkR^itya vedApaurushheyatvaM pratyAchaxANAn.h 
  sarvAn.h prati chAyaM prasaN^ga ityatastenApi dharmAdikaM
  aN^gIkaryairnaM prasaN^gaM vaxyAma, iti Ashayena Aha --
 `yashcha', iti  |  tau dharmAdharmau  |  iti prasajyeta, iti
  sheshhaH  |  dharmAdyanaN^gIkAre kutastachchhAstrasya
  ashAstratvaprasaN^go yena asau shAstrI na syAd.h, ityata
  Aha -- `aprayojakatvAt.h', iti  |  prayujyate pravartyate
  praNetA shrotA cha shAstre yAbhyAM te preyojake, vishhaya-
  prayojane  |  avidyamAne prayojake yasya shAstrasya tat.h
  tathA  |  ananyalAbhaM kimapi purushhArthamadhikR^itya
  tatsAdhanaM tathAvidhamarthaM pratipAdayan.h vAkyasamUho hi
  shAstram.h  |  anyathA.atiprasaN^gAt.h  |  nachAtIndriyasya
  abhAve.anyattathAbhUtaM shakyanirUpaNam.h  |  ataH shAstratva-
  siddhaye vishhayAditvena dharmAdikaM kimapyaN^gIkAryamiti
  bhAvaH  |

  "However, [says the chArvAka] in respect of the materialist who 
  accepts only pratyaxa and does not accept right and wrong, this 
  is not undesirable."  If no unauthored sentence whatsoever is 
  accepted, and the objection against those who reject the 
  unauthoredness of the Vedas is refuted thus, then it will be
  shown that even such people must accept dharma, etc.; to state
  this, it is said, `yashcha', thus.  `tau' refers to dharma and
  adharma.  `iti prasajyeta', thus is the remainder.  "However, on
  what basis can it be said that the subject is not a shâstra and
  the scholar thus not a `shAstrI'?" -- to answer this, it is said:
 `due to wastefulness', thus.  That which provides some use, and
  motivates to action, the speaker as well as the listener, that
  is a shâstra, for having a useful subject.  That which has an
  unique use is a shâstra, thus also.  Some gain which cannot be
  otherwise obtained, and some means of obtaining the same, a
  collection of statements which provides these, is verily a 
  shâstra.  Otherwise, anything at all could be called a shâstra.
  And then, too, it is the case that without extra-sensory objects,
  such tenets cannot be expounded (since all sense-perceivable
  entities may be obtained in other ways than through the study of
  the chArvAka's doctrine).  Therefore, in order to earn the status
  of shâstra-ness, it needs must be the case that some dharma, etc.,
  must be accepted.  

bhAshhya --

mAstu dharmo.anirUpyatvAditi chenna  |  sarvAbhimatasya
pramANaM vinA nishheddhumashakyatvAt.h  |  na cha 
siddhiraprAmANikasyeti chenna  |  sarvAbhimatereva 
pramANatvAt.h  |

"Let it not be so, for right and wrong are not fit to be propounded,"
thus say you? -- no (that is not right).  Because something accepted
by all cannot be refuted without proof [for the refutation].  "But
there is no value to something that is incorrect (even if accepted by
all)," so say you? -- no.  Because correctness is only in the
acceptance by all.

pra. dI. --

  shaN^kate -- `mAstu', iti  |  `mA.ayaM', na mAN^'.  astu iti
  avyayaM vA  |  dharma ityupalaxaNam.h  |  anirUpyatvAt.h
  pramANAbhAvena pratipAdayitumashakyatvAt.h  |  idamuktaM
  bhavati  |  vishhayaprayojane hi te bhavata ye pramANena
  pratipAdayituM shakye  |  vAN^mAtrasya shrotR^ibhiranAda-
  raNAt.h  |  na cha dharmAdikaM pramANena pratipAdayituM
  shakyam.h  |  pratyaxAgocharatvAt.h  |  anumAnAdeshcha
  prAmANyAbhAvAt.h  |  ato na shAstravishhayatvAdinA dharmAdikaM
  aN^gIkartuM uchitam.h  |  nachaitAvatA nirvishhayatvAdi
  ApattiH  |  yato dharmAdyabhAvo vishhayo bhavishhyati  |
  prayojanaM cha shR^otR^INAM dharmAdyanushhThAnaprasakta
  kleshanivR^ittiH  |  dharmAdisadbhAVabhramoparuddhavishhaya-
  sukhAvAptishcha  |  praNetushcha lokopakAraH  |  upakartAraM
  cha pratyupakurvanti lokA, iti nirAkaroti -- `na' iti  |  evaM
  vadatA dharmAdyabhAvo.api na shAstravishhayatvena shakyate
  vaktum.h  |  sarvAbhimatasya dharmAdeH pramANaM vinA vAN^.h
  mAtreNa nishheddhuM nAstIti pratipAdayitumashakyatvAt.h  |
  ghaTAdyabhAva iva pratyaxeNaiva dharmAdyabhAvo nishcheshhyata
  iti chet.h ?  syAdevaM yadyatra na kAchit.h vipratipattiH  |
  yatra tvastivAbhimAnaH, tatra pishAchAdAviva pratyaxAnupalambhaH
  sandehahetureva bhavatIti  |  tadidamuktaM -- `sarvAbhimatasya'
  iti  |  

  Such is the doubt -- `mA astu', thus.  `Not this', therefore,
  not `mAN^'.  `Let it be', thus is the unchanging, otherwise.
  Thus is stated [by the chArvAka]: "That alone is fit to be 
  called a subject that gives benefit, which can be shown through 
  some pramANa.  Mere statement [without proof] would be 
  disregarded by listeners.  But dharma, etc., cannot be shown 
  through pramANa, on account of not being grasped by pratyaksha.  
  And because anumAna, etc., do not have prAmANya at all.  
  Therefore, it is not proper to say that dharma, etc., are to be 
  accepted as subjects of shâstra.  It may also not be said that 
  this doctrine (i.e., that of the chArvAka) is without a valid 
  subject.  Since just the lack of dharma, etc., is itself its 
  subject.  The use of the same is that the listeners are freed 
  from the sufferings arising out of belief in dharma, etc.  And 
  on account of the removal of delusion in the matter of dharma, 
  etc., sensory enjoyment may also be obtained.  The use for the 
  proponent is the benefiting of the world; the world at large 
  which has benefited, will reward the proponent in turn," thus.
  This is refuted -- `na', thus.  Even if this be stated, then
  on account of lack of dharma, etc., the subject of shâstra may
  not be claimed.  Since dharma, etc., being accepted by all,
  cannot be refuted merely by someone's say-so.  "But just as with
  the absence of a pot, the absence of dharma may likewise be
  decided merely by pratyaksha," thus say you?  That is however
  only possible where there is no possibility of contradiction.
  Where there is belief in presence (even lacking direct perception),
  there as with ghosts, etc., the absence of pratyaksha would lead
  to doubt only (rather than to certainty about absence) -- thus.
  To say this, it has been stated, `sarvAbhimatasya', thus.
The point about ghosts, etc., has been clarified by Sri Jayatîrtha in the pramANa-paddhati as follows:
   `asmin.h vaTe pishAcho.asti' iti vArtA shrutavato vaTasamIpaM 
    gatasya tatra pishAchAnupalabdhau satyAM nirNAyakAbhAve saMshayo 
    bhavati  | `kiM vidyamAna eva pishAcho.antardhAnashaktyA
    nopalabhyate kiM vA avidyamAna eva?' -- iti  |

    "In this fig tree there resides a ghost," upon hearing such a
    statement one who goes near the tree and does not perceive the ghost
    has a doubt on account of the lack of decisive evidence: "Is a ghost
    that verily is present not perceived on account of its power of
    invisibility, or else is there none at all?" -- thus.
Continuing with the prameya-dIpikA:
  punashshaN^kate -- `na cha' iti  |  mA bhUddharmAdi
  abhAvasya vishhayatvam.h  |  tatsAdhakapramANAbhAvAt.h  |
  tathApi dharmAdervishhayatvAdikaM na ghaTate  |  apramANakasya
  pramityanupapattyA sAdhayitumashakyatvAditi  |  nirAkaroti
  -- `na' iti  |  asti tAvaddharmAdivishhaye sarveshhAmAvipAla-
  gopAlamastitvAbhimAnaH  |  abhimAno j~nAnameva  |  na cha
  tasya bAdhakaM kiJNchit.h  |  dharmAdyabhAvapratipAdaka-
  pramANAbhAvasyoktatvAt.h  |  ataH sarvAbhimatereva dharmAdau
  pramAtvAt.h, tatkaraNasya cha pramANatvAt.h asiddhaM
  aprAmANikatvamiti bhAvaH  |  kiM tat.h pramANaM, iti chet.h ?
  dharmAdeH prAmANikatvasiddhau kimanaya vyarthachintayA  |
  na cha tatra pramANavisheshho.ashakyanirUpaNaH  |  Agamasya
  tatsahakAriNo.anumAnasya cha sattvAt.h  |  ata eva
  nA.andhaparamparA.api  |  

  Another doubt is cast: `na cha', thus.  "Let it be granted that
  the lack of dharma, etc., cannot be a valid subject.  On account
  of pramANa-s to prove the same.  Even then, dharma, etc., cannot
  be subjects, etc., also.  Because that lacking a pramANa cannot
  be a subject of proof, and cannot be shown at all therefore."
  This is refuted -- `na', thus.  There certainly exists the
  belief in existence in respect of right and wrong, in all,
  even shepherds and cowherds.  Such belief is knowledge, only, for
  there is no barrier at all to the same, the lack of any pramANa
  to show the lack of dharma, etc., having been stated.  Therefore,
  as acceptance by all itself is the knowledge in respect of dharma,
  etc., and by that reason is also a pramANa, the lack of validity
  (in respect of dharma, etc.) is unproven.  But what could such
  pramANa be, so say you?  Why such wasted thought, when dharma, etc.,
  are shown to be prAmANika?  In respect of these, pramANa-s, etc.,
  are not impossible to state, because textual evidence and its
  ancillary logic are available.  Thus only is it that [the acceptance
  of dharma] is not merely blind tradition.
At this, the chArvAka naturally claims that textual evidence and inference are themselves not valid means of knowledge, and hence do not count as sources of support for dharma, etc.  To answer this, it is said:
bhAshhya --

anyathA sarvavAchikavyavahArAsiddheshcha  |  na cha mayA
shrutamiti tava j~nAtuM shakyam.h  |  anyathA vA pratyuttaraM
syAt.h ?  bhrAntirvA syAt.h ?

Otherwise, all usage of speech would be unfounded.  It would not be
possible for you to know what I heard.  Or else, what could be the
reply?  Or if there was delusion?

pra. dI. --

  AgamAdeH prAmANyaM nAstItyuktamityata Aha -- `anyathA' iti  |
  yadi Agamasya anumAnasya cha na prAMANyaM syAt.h, tadA
  sarvasya vAchA nirvartyasya vyavahArasya asiddhiH syAt.h ?
  parapratyayanArtho hi vAgvyavahAraH  |  sa yadi na paraM
  pratyAyayet.h vyartho na kriyetaiveti  |  chashabdaH
  pramANasAmAnyasiddhyA tadvisheshhasiddheH samuchchaye  |

  There is no validity to textual evidence, to those who claim
  this, it is stated -- `anyathA', thus.  If there were to be no
  validity to textual evidence or to anumAna, then all spoken
  language would be stopped and exchanges based on it would be
  unfounded.  Only for the information of another, is the usage
  of speech.  If that were to not inform another, then would it
  not be a waste? -- thus.  The word `cha' (in `vyavahArAsiddheH
  cha') is used to show the special in the pramANa-s after their
  usual has been shown.  

  bhavatvAgamAprAmANye vAchanikavyavahArAsiddhiH  |  anumAna-
  prAmANye tu kathamityata Aha -- `na cha' iti  |  tvadIya
  vAkyaM mayA shrUyata iti j~nAtvA mAM prati tvayA vAgvyavahAraH
  kriyate.anyathA vA ?  dvitIye nishhphalo na kartavyaH syAt.h ?
  nAdyaH -- parachittavR^ittInAM parasyApratyaxatvena mayA
  shrutamiti tava j~nAtumashakyatvAt.h madIyaM pratyuttarameva
  tajj~nAnopAya ityevaM vaktavyamiti bhAvaH  |  astvevamityata
  Aha -- `anyathA vA' iti  |  vAshabdo.avadhAraNe  |  
  pratyuttaraM hi liN^gatayA j~nApakam.h  |  na cha tava mate
  anumAnaM pramANam.h  |  ataH pratyuttaramanyathaivaj~nApakameva
  syAditi  |  

  "Let it be that if texts were to not be pramANa-s, then all
  usage of speech would be unfounded.  But how is the prAmANya of
  anumAna known?" -- to answer this, it is said, `na cha', thus.
  To know that a statement made by you was heard by me, would you
  make another statement (question) to me, or something else?
  In the second case, on account of uselessness, that would not
  be appropriate (as there is no pramANa that would do).  Not the
  first (either); for the state of another's mind cannot be known
  through pratyaksha, and that it (your statement) has been heard
  by me, thus cannot be known by you [directly], and hence only
  my statement of reply could be a source of knowledge in this
  regard to you, thus is to be stated, so is the purport.  "Let it
  be so," to answer this, it is stated, `anyathA vA', thus.  The
  word `vA' is used to indicate certainty.  Only the response would
  qualify as the means of knowledge.  In your doctrine, inference
  is not accepted as a pramANa.  Thus, would the reply inform
  otherwise only, possibly? -- thus.  

  nanu shabdaliN^gayoH prAmANyameva nAN^gIkriyate  |
  j~nApakatvamAtraM tvaN^gIkriyata eva  |  ataH kathaM vAchika-
  vyavahArasiddhirityata Aha -- `bhrAntirvA' iti  |  j~nApakatvaM
  aN^gIkR^itya prAmANyAnaN^gIkAre shabdaliN^gAbhyAM jAyamAnaH
  pratyayastava mate bhrAntirvA syAt.h saMshayo vA ?
  gatyantarAbhAvAt.h  |  na cha parasya bhrAntyAdyarthaM
  vachanaprayogaH  |  nApi pratyuttareNa bhrAntaH sandigdho vA
  vAkyaM prayuN^kta iti yuktam.h  |  ato vAchikavyavahArasiddhi
  arthaM AgamAnumAnaprAmANyamaN^gIkAryamiti  |  

  "However, the words and their derivatives are not accepted as
  having any prAmANya, at all.  They are only accepted as mnemonics
  [that remind one of the already-known].  Thus, how do you derive
  [above from] the usage of speech?" -- to answer this, it is said,
  `bhrAntirvA', thus.  If only rememoration is accepted in your
  doctrine in respect of words and their derivatives, but no 
  validity is, then both delusion and doubt are possible?  On account
  of there being no way to avoid these.  However, it cannot be that
  [all] usage of speech is in order to cause delusion, etc., in
  others!  It also is not proper to say that the deluded or the 
  doubtful uses speech in order to obtain responses.  Therefore, in
  order to facilitate ease of spoken communication, the prAmANya of
  textual evidence and inference must be granted -- thus.
The point being made above is that there being no direct perception of the state of another's mind, it would not be possible for one to know that another has understood what one has said; this cannot be known from the other's reply either because, lacking inference, there is no correlation between understanding and response.  Therefore, one would not be able to separate the deluded and the doubtful from the one having genuine understanding, and thus, all spoken communication would become ineffective.  Therefore, the prAmANya of textual evidence as well as of inference must be granted, if communication is to be considered feasible.
bhAshhya --

sarvaduHkhakAraNatvam.h vA syAt.h  |  eko vA.anyathA syAt.h  |

Or else, would it not be a cause of all misery?  One or the
other would be?

pra. dI. --

  evaM chArvAkashAstrasya vishhayaM nirAkR^itya prayojanamapi 
  nirAkurvan.h shrotR^iprayojanaM tAvannirAchashhTe -- `sarva'
  iti  |  yathA shAstrasya sarveshhAM shrotR^INAM sukhakAraNatvaM
  tathA dharmAdyabhAvaj~nAne sarvamaryAdA.atikrame 
  parasparahiMsAdinA sarvaduHkhakAraNatvaM cha syAt.h  |  tathA
  cha samavyayaphalaM nishhprayojanameveti  |  idAnIM
  shAstrapraNetR^iprayojanaM nirAkaroti -- `eko vA' iti  |
  dharmAdij~nAnashUnyAH pashuprAyA nopakAriNamupakurvanti  |
  api tu sarve.apyakartumalam.h  |  tadabhAve.api eko vA.anyathA
  apakArakaH syAdityarthaH  |  tadevaM dharmAdyanaN^gIkAre
  shAstrasya vishhayAbhAvenAshAstratvaprasaN^gAt.h sarvaiH
  dharmAdikamaN^gIkAryamiti  |

  And having refuted the subject of the chArvAka-shAstra, even the
  usefulness of the same is to be refuted; for this, the usefulness
  to the listener is refuted, `sarva', thus.  Just as a shâstra is
  to have benefits to all its eligible recipients, so also, on
  account of the knowledge of lack of right and wrong, etc., all
  honor would be overthrown, and due to mutual violence, etc.,
  suffering to all would result?  So also, that with equal loss and
  gain is useless, only (i.e., even if it be claimed that there is
  some loss on account of miscreants' violence and some gain, then
  the doctrine still cannot be called a shâstra).  The usefulness
  of this shâstra to its proponent is refuted -- `eko vA', thus.
  Those not having knowledge of dharma, etc., are like wild beasts,
  and do not reward their benefactors.  On the other hand, they are
  all complete malefactors.  Even if that is not present, one or the
  other would be a malefactor? -- thus is the purport.  For this
  reason only, because if dharma, etc., are not accepted, there is
  no subject, etc., for the shâstra, it becomes a non-shâstra,
  all must accept dharma, etc.

bhAshhya --

rachitatve cha dharmapramANasya karturaj~nAnAdidoshhashaN^kA
syAt.h  |  nachAdoshhatvaM svavAkyenaiva siddhyati  |

In composed sentences offered as proof of dharma, doubt about the
ignorance of the author, etc., obtains.  Lack of flaw is not proven by
one's own statements.

pra. dI --

  nanu svIkR^itaM dharmAdikam.h  |  paurushheyavAkyAt.h
  tannishchayaH syAdityata Aha -- `rachitatve cha' iti  |
  tatashcha na dharmAdinishchaya iti bhAvaH  |  nirdoshhatvena
  pramito.asAviti chet.h ?  tasya nirdoshhatvaM kiM tadvAkyAt.h
  siddhaM pramANAntareNa vA ?  na dvitIyaH  |  tadabhAvAt.h  |
  AdyaM dUshhayati -- `na cha', iti  |  atiprasaN^gAditi bhAvaH  |

  Let dharma, etc., be accepted.  However, decision about the
  same is perhaps possible using authored sentences? -- for that,
  it is said, `rachitatve cha', thus.  By those, there can be no
  decision in respect of dharma, etc., thus is the purport.  "But
  those are correct for being flawless," thus say you?  Is their
  flawlessness proven from their own statements, or from other
  pramANa-s?  Not the second.  For there is lack of the same.
  The first is refuted -- `na cha', thus.  Because there is excess
  over legitimate domain, thus is the purport.  

  na cha pratyaxAdinA dharmAdisiddhiH  |  ataH sarvaiH
  kimapyapaurushheyaM vAkyamaN^gIkAryam.h  |  aN^gIkR^itaM cha
  bauddhAdibhiH svasamayApaurushheyatvam.h, `shauddhodani-
  prabhR^itayassampradAyapravartakAH' ityuktatvAt.h  |  tataH
  kimiti chet.h ?  vAkyatvaheto tatrAnaikAntyamiti  |

  And dharma, etc., cannot be proved from pratyaksha, etc.  Thus, all
  must accept some unauthored sentences or the other.  It is also
  accepted by the Buddhists that their doctrine is unauthored, on
  account of the statement "the son of Shuddhodana (i.e., Buddha) and
  others were propagators of the [pre-existing] tradition," thus.  So
  what, say you?  The inference from sententiality is inconclusive,
In other words, if it is accepted that entities such as space, or the Buddhist tradition, are unauthored, but it is claimed that anything consisting of sentences must be authored, then we say that the inference, "whatever is a sentence, that has an author," is not conclusive; similar arguments can be run with equal facility to yield unacceptable results: in this regard, see the write-up at
  astvevamanumAnasya anyatarAnaikAntyAt.h shruterapaurushheyatve
  bAdhakAbhAvaH  |  sAdhakaM tu kimiti chet.h ?
  karturaprasiddhirapaurushheyatvaprasiddhishcheti brUmaH  |

  Let there be a lack of obstacles to the unauthoredness of Shruti 
  on account of the inconclusiveness of logic (the inference from
  sententiality).  But what is the proof, even?" -- thus say you?
  The lack of fame of creators (for Vedic statements) and the fame
  for being unauthored, thus is the reply.

bhAshhya --

na cha yenakenachidapaurushheyamityuktamuktavAkyasamam.h  |
anAdikAlaparigrahasiddhatvAt.h  |  ataH prAmANyaM shruteH  |

It can certainly not be the case that some statement or the other
which is [falsely] stated to be unauthored, is similar to these.
As beginningless study [of these] is proven.  Therefore, the
prAmANya of Shruti.

pra. dI. --

  evaM tarhi gUDhakartR^ikasya kR^itApaurushheyatvaprasiddhi-
  kasyApyapaurushheyatvaprasaN^ga ityata Aha -- `na cha', iti  |
  kenachit.h kR^itamiti sheshhaH  |  uktavAkyasamaM vedavad.h
  apaurushheyamityarthaH  |  anAdikAle yaH parigrahaH prAktanaM
  evaitaditi j~nAnaM tena vishhayIkR^itatvAt.h shruteH  |
  itarasya tadabhAvAt.h apaurushheyatvaprasiddhireva tatra
  bhagneti bhAvaH  |  apaurushheyatvasiddhau siddhamarthaM
  upasaMharati -- `ata', iti  |

  "But in case of some secretly composed statement given the fame
  for unauthoredness, such unauthoredness would have to be accepted,"
  in answer to this objection, it is stated, `na cha', thus.  
  "Composed by someone or the other," thus is the remainder.  Equal
  to the stated [Vedic] sentences, in being unauthored, thus is the
  meaning.  This statement has existed in all of beginningless time,
  and has only been expressed, thuslike knowledge exists in the
  subject of Shruti.  As it does not exist in respect of others,
  the fame of unauthoredness itself is violated in respect of them,
  thus is the purport.  The end that is achieved when the 
  unauthoredness [of Shruti] is proven, is stated: `Therefore' [the
  prAmANya of Shruti], thus.

bhAshhya --

ataH kutarkairdhIrastatra na muhyati  || 13 ||

Therefore, by perverted arguments, "the intelligent one is not 
deluded." || 13 ||

pra. dI. --

  evaM cha chaturthapAdopayuktaM prameyamuktvA tadidAnIM
  niveshayati -- `ata', iti  |  yata evaM nairAtmyavAdibhiH
  utprexitAH kutarkA atastaiH kutarkaiH dhIraH dhImAn.h tatra
  dehAtiriktanityAtmasadbhAvavishhaye na mohamApadyate  |
 `narake niyataM vAsaH' ityAdyarjunavachanena tasya nityAtma-
  pratipattisiddheH prathamapurushhaprayogaH  || 13 ||

  Then, too, stating the prameya stated in the fourth part of the
  verse, it is explained here, `ata', thus.  As it is the case that
  the statement of the ones holding that there is nothing 
  pertaining to the self is a sophism (*), `dhIraH', i.e., the
  wise one, is not deluded on the subject of the existence of the
  soul that is different from the body.  As `continued residence
  in hell' (I-44), thuslike statements of Arjuna prove the existence
  of an eternal soul, the third person is used (in `dhIraH tatra na
  muhyati'; Arjuna understands this, clearly, so the statement is
  being made about others).
(*) The calling of Advaita as `nairAtmyavAda' is based on the following Shruti:
    atha j~nAnopasargAH  |  rAjan.h mohajAlasyaishha vai yoniryad.h
    asvargaiH saha svargyA Ashlishhyanti  | ... atha ye chAnye ha 
    mithyAtarkaiH dR^ishhTAntaiH kuhakendrajAlaiH vaidikeshhu 
    paristhAtumichchhanti taiH saha na saMvaset.h  |
    prAkAshyabhUta vai te taskarA asvargyA ityevaM hi Aha --

    nairAtmyavAdakuhakairmithyAdR^ishhTAntahetubhiH  |
    bhrAmya.Nlloko na jAnAti vedavidyAntaraM tu yat.h  ||

    Now, the obstacles to knowledge: O King, this web of delusion has
    its origin in that the pious associate with the impious... these, 
    and others who, with illusory logic (or: logic claiming to show 
    illusion and illustrations, wish to insert themselves among 
    Vaidika-s -- do not abide with them.  They are indeed daylight 
    robbers, and are un-heavenly, for that alone it is stated:

    On account of the web of illusory examples and logic of the 
    doctrine that holds that there is nothing concerning the Atman, 
    the world wanders about not knowing the higher, true essence of 
    the Vedas.
This Shruti is cited by Srimad Âchârya in the VTVN (`maitreyIshAkhAyAM cha atha j~nAnopasargA ityuktvA', etc.); while it may have the flavor of an `aprasiddha-shruti', it is (unfortunately for the Advaitins) actually available, being in the maitrAyaNIya upanishhad.h VII-8 which gives a list of various false doctrines that are to be rejected by the seeker, with the `nairAtmyavAda' being the last, and goes on to state that Brihaspati, the preceptor of the deities, took on the form of Shukracharya, the preceptor of the demons, and created these to destroy the latter and protect Indra: `bR^ihaspatirvai shukro bhUtvendrasyAbhayAyAsurebhyaH xayAyemAM avidyAM asR^ijat.h' (the chArvAka doctrine is also thus called the `bR^ihaspati-shAstra'). The Advaitins claim, and J.A.B. van Buitenen's translation (Mouton & Co., The Hague, Netherlands, 1962; BL 1120. A54B8) says, that this `nairAtmyavAda' is the "doctrine that holds there is no Atman," i.e., the Buddhists.  However, this is incorrect on two grounds: one, because as Sri Jayatîrtha points out in the VTVN-TIkA, the Buddhists cannot be said to wish to insert themselves among the Vaidika-s (`vaidikeshhu paristhAtuM ichchhanti'), i.e., to pass themselves off as Vedantins, their purpose indeed being to wipe out Vedanta.  Second, grammatically, `nairAtmyavAda' is properly read as `AtmasambandhI kimapi nAstIti nairAtmyavAdaH' -- the doctrine which holds that there is nothing other than the Atman, is nairAtmyavAda.  Buddhism would have to be referred to as `nirAtmavAda', not as `nairAtmyavAda'. It is significant, therefore, that Sri Jayatîrtha shows that the verse II-13 is actually refuting the claim made by Sri Shankara in his commentary on the previous verse.  Hence it is that the Upanishad describes the proponents of nairAtmyavAda as `prAkAshyabhUta vai te taskarA' -- verily daylight robbers, for making bold to propound a doctrine that is openly opposed to the tenets of the texts while claiming to expound them, and thus for taking away the purport of the shâstra-s before one's very eyes.
bhAshhya --

atha vA jIvanAshaM dehanAshaM vA.apexya shokaH ?  na 
jIvanAsham.h nityatvAd.h, ityAha -- `na tveva', iti  || 12 ||  

Or otherwise, is the grief on account of the destruction of the soul
or on account of the destruction of the body?  There is no destruction
of the soul on account of eternality, to show this it is said, "Just
as it was never that I was not," thus.  || 12 ||

bhagavad.h gItA -- (*)

  na tvevAhaM jAtu nAsaM na tvaM neme janAdhipAH  |
  na chaiva na bhavishhyAmaH sarve vayamataH param.h  || 12 ||

  Just as it was never that I was not, [likewise] not [that] you 
  [were not], nor [that] these rulers of people [were not]; not 
  certainly also will there ever be a time when we shall not exist, 
  for which reason we are all eternal.
bhAshhya --
nApi dehanAshamityAha -- `dehina' iti  |  yathA kaumArAdidehahAnena 
jarAdiprAptAvashoka evaM jIrNAdidehahAnena dehAntaraprAptAvapi  || 13 ||

Not even due to destruction of the body, for that it is stated, `the
embodied', thus.  Just as there is no grief in case of loss of a
youthful body, etc. and the obtaining of an aged one, etc., so also
with the loss of an old body and the obtaining of a new one.  || 13 ||

bhagavad.h gItA -- (*)

  dehino.asmin.h yathA dehe kaumAraM yauvanaM jarA  |
  tathA dehAntaraprAptirdhIrastatra na muhyati  || 13 ||

  Just as the embodied experiences the infancy, the youth, and the
  old age of the body; so also the obtaining of another body, and
  in this matter the intelligent one is not deluded.

pra. dI. --

  anekArthA gIteti darshayituM shlokadvayaM prakArAntareNa
  vyAchashhTe -- `atha vA', iti  |  na jIvanAshamapexya shokaH
  kArya iti sheshhaH  |  nityatvAt.h jIvasya  |  anena yojanA
  pUrvavadeveti j~nApayati  || 12 || nApItyatrApi pUrvavat.h
  sheshhaH  |  atra pUrvayojanA na saN^gachchhate  |  ato.anyathA
  pAdatrayaM vyAkhyAti -- `yathA', iti  |  jarAdiprAptau
  dehAntaraprAptAvapi nimittasaptamyau  |  tatashchAyamarthaH  |
  kaumArAdyavasthAvishishhTadehahAne tAvat.h nAsti shoka iti
  prasiddham.h  |  tat.h kasya hetoriti vAchyam.h  |  jarAdi-
  vishishhTadehAntaralAbhAt.h  |  samAnalAbhena hAnirhi
  samAdhIyata iti chet.h ?  tarhi maraNe.api shoko na kAryaH,
  dehAntaralAbhAdeva  |  yadA tu jIrNalAbhena samIchInahAneH
  pratividhAnaM tadA sutarAM samIchInalAbhena jIrNahAneriti  |
  tatrAvasthAmAtrahAniH, atratu avasthAvato.apyetadanupayuktaM
  vaishhamyam.h  |  nishhkapradAnena paTagrahaNadarshanAditi
  bhAvenoktaM `dhIraH' iti  || 13 ||

  In order to illustrate that the 'Gita is of multifarious meanings,
  the two verses are expounded in a different manner -- `or otherwise',
  thus.  "It is not proper to grieve on account of the destruction
  of the soul," thus is the remainder.  Because the soul is eternal.
  Here the layout is as previously.  Even in `na api' (not even),
  as before is the remainder (i.e., "it is not proper to grieve on
  account of the destruction of the body").  The previous manner
  cannot be entirely used (duplicated); hence the three quarters are 
  explained in a different manner: "just as," thus.  To illustrate
  the causality, in `jarAdiprAptau' and `dehAntaraprAptAvapi', the
  saptami is used.  Thus is the meaning of the same: there is no
  grief when the specialized body of infancy, etc., is lost, thus is
  well known.  Why is this so? -- may be asked.  Because the 
  specialized body of old age, etc., is obtained.  "But on account of
  the equality of gain, there is no loss," thus say you?  Then even
  upon death, grief is certainly  not appropriate, as a different 
  body is obtained (to replace the one lost).  Just as when a worn-out
  one is obtained and a youthful one lost [there is no grief], so
  also when a worn-out one is lost to facilitate the obtaining of
  a new one.  "However, there only the state of the body is lost,
  while here even the body that undergoes changes of state is,"
  sorrow on this count is likewise inappropriate.  For it is seen
  that coin is given and cloth procured -- with this in mind, it
  is stated, "the intelligent," thus.  || 13 ||
(*) The verses II-12 and II-13 are not quoted in the bhAshhya at these points, but I have inserted them for ease of reference.

N.B.  The derivation of the need for dharma, etc., and the prAmANya of Shruti are also discussed in detail in the 'tattva-nirNaya.  Scholars well-versed in that text may be consulted in this regard.

Sri Raghavendra Tîrtha's purport may be of interest in this connection.

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This article is due to Shrisha Rao.

Created February 19, 1999.